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1  FACTS
One Mr Shaik was convicted in the Durban High Court on several counts 
relating to corruption with regards to payments he had made to the former 
Deputy President Mr Jacob Zuma and that he had bribed Mr Zuma to protect 
a French armaments company. Several companies which Mr Shaik controls, 
or in which he has a major interest, were also convicted. Mr Shaik and the 
companies sought leave to appeal against the convictions by the High Court 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal. Mr Shaik also sought leave to appeal against 
an order of civil forfeiture granted by the High Court in terms of the Preven-
tion of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998.1
Before the proceedings commenced the applicant informally requested permis-
sion from the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Appeal to broadcast the proceed-
ings. The Registrar, in line with the practice of the Supreme Court of Appeal, in-
formed the applicant that visual recordings only without sound would be allowed. 
The applicant then made formal application to the Supreme Court of Appeal to 
broadcast the entire proceedings live on television and radio, as well as the right 
to produce edited highlights packages for television and radio audiences. 
2  ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
The Applicant argued that the broadcasts were necessary to enable it to fulfill 
its constitutional, as well as statutory obligations in terms of the Broadcasting 
Act 4 of 1999, adding that the case involved issues of intense national inter-
est; the broadcast would have educational benefits and would not disrupt the 
conduct of the hearing.
  1  Judgment of the Constitutional Court, South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v National Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions and Others, case no. CC-2006/58, 21 September 2006, para 3, available at 
http://concourt.law.wits.ac.za/judgment.php?case_id=13372
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The respondents argued that there was no constitutional right to broadcast 
judicial proceedings. They contended that section 173 of the Constitution, 
1996 gave the courts the power to regulate their own proceedings and hence 
constituted a constitutional limitation to the right to freedom of expression. 
They argued that the right to freedom of expression was protected by other 
methods of reporting and that broadcasting would violate the respondent’s 
rights to a fair trial.    
3  JUDGMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
The court held that the right of the applicant to freedom of expression and 
the respondent’s right to a fair trial were in direct conflict with each other. 
The court held that because of section 173 of the Constitution it had to em-
bark on a balancing exercise between the right of the applicant to freedom 
of expression and the respondent’s right to a fair trial. The court held that in 
the exercise fair trial rights had to take precedence over the right to freedom 
of expression. ‘[I]f anyone has to give way, it should not be the litigant that 
faced a loss of liberty if convicted.’ 
The court found that the television and radio broadcasts violated fair trial 
rights because of two reasons. Firstly, the broadcast would put ‘stress’ on 
both counsel and the judges, inhibiting interaction, thereby creating the ma-
terial risk that justice would be impaired. Secondly, there was a risk that the 
broadcasts might prejudice ‘the rights of both the State and Mr Zuma to a fair 
trial’ because the extensive broadcasts might deter witnesses from testifying 
in the Zuma trial due to the critical exposure they may be subjected to which 
during any appeal. The court also held that the unfettered questioning of 
counsel may create the impression with the public that the guilt or innocence 
of Mr Zuma is being prejudged. The court accordingly dismissed the applica-
tion. The court also held that edited packages might create a risk of misrepre-
sentation and misunderstanding and refused that relief.
The applicant then approached the Constitutional Court on an urgent basis 
seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
All the parties to the criminal appeal and the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions opposed the application. The Constitutional Court found that 
the application for leave to appeal should be granted. 
4  ISSUES BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The following constitutional issues were raised before the Constitutional 
Court:
(1) The nature of the right to a fair trial in context of a criminal appeal.
(2) The ambit of the right to freedom of expression of the press and to receive 
information in section 16 of the Constitution, 1996, with specific regard 
to the media’s role to inform the public about the legal system.
(3) The existence and role of the ‘principle of open justice.’ 
(4) The power of the Supreme Court of Appeal to regulate its own proceed-
ings under section 173 of the Constitution, 1996.
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5  JUDGMENT IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The Constitutional Court held that it was the primary constitutional respon-
sibility of a court of appeal to ensure that the proceedings before it were fair 
and the court must give content to that obligation. This obligation has always 
been part of South African law and is now constitutionally enshrined as a 
fundamental right in section 35(3) of the Constitution. The brief to ensure 
that proceedings are fair will often require that principles and practical factors 
which may not point in the same direction have to be considered. 
The Court furthermore held that the right to a fair trial had been interpreted 
by the Constitutional Court as including the foundational values of dignity, 
freedom and equality which lie ‘at the heart of a fair trial in the field of crimi-
nal justice’ and as embracing ‘a concept of substantive fairness which is not 
to be equated with what might have passed muster in our criminal courts 
before the Constitution came into force.’
The Court, as it had frequently done before, emphasised that freedom of 
expression lies at the heart of every democracy. However, the Court noted 
that whether right to freedom of expression included the right of the media 
to televise and broadcast court proceedings was debatable. The Court noted 
that in democratic jurisdictions such as The United States of America, Ger-
many and England the right to freedom of expression has been held not to 
include the right of the media to televise and broadcast court proceedings. 
The Court preferred to avoid answering this question because of the urgent 
nature of the proceedings and assumed in favour of the applicant that there 
is such a right. 
The Court noted that is was not the rights and responsibility of the South 
African Broadcasting Corporation that was central to the issue. It was rather 
the right of the public to be informed and educated. This was essential for 
meaningful involvement of ordinary citizens in public life. In this case it con-
cerned the right of South Africans to know and understand the way and man-
ner in which the judiciary functions. This presupposes that courts are open 
and accessible. This is important in ensuring that courts are accountable and 
that accused individuals have fair trials.  
The Court accordingly did not find it surprising that section 35(3)(c) of the 
Constitution included as one of the aspects of a fair trial the right to ‘a public 
trial before an ordinary court’. The Court also noted that section 34 of the 
Constitution similarly entrenched the right to have disputes resolved ‘in a fair 
public hearing before a court.’
The Court held that courts should in principle welcome exposure of their 
workings as long as the proceedings are fair. The Court noted that the open 
justice principle is observed in the ordinary course by allowing the public 
and the press to attend the hearings and for the press to report on the pro-
ceedings. In addition the Supreme Court of Appeal had given the applicant 
permission to make recordings without sound and to televise the recordings 
or extracts thereof. The narrow issue was therefore the extension of the open 
justice principle to allow the audio coverage, the broadcasting of the entire 
proceedings as well as edited highlights.  
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The Court noted that the question before it was not whether cameras should 
be allowed into courts, it is whether the Court should interfere with the dis-
cretion of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the particular appeal in the specific 
circumstances and order that the additional coverage be permitted. 
In terms of section 173 of the Constitution, 1996, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has the power to regulate and protect its own process taking into ac-
count the interests of justice. A primary aspect of the exercise of that power 
is to ensure that the proceedings are fair. The Court held that the exercise of 
this power will inevitably affect rights in the Bill of Rights including the right 
to a fair trial in section 35 and the right to have disputes resolved by courts in 
section 34. In the exercise of this power these rights must not be unjustifiably 
interfered with. The judgment will furthermore often have to be exercised in 
the light of a complex range of factors. 
The Court did not see the question being as to whether they would have 
adopted an identical test. The question was whether the Supreme Court of 
Appeal did not act judicially in exercising its section 173 rights, or based the 
decision on incorrect principles of law or on a misdirection of the facts.
The Constitutional Court noted that it had on the one hand assumed that 
the judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal had infringed the right to free-
dom of expression. The Court furthermore acknowledged that openness and 
accountability were underlying values of the Constitution. On the other hand 
the Supreme Court of Appeal had the primary obligation to ensure that trials 
are fair. The Court, as the Supreme Court of Appeal had done, held that fair 
trial rights included the right to an appeal and ‘the appeal must be subject to 
considerations of fairness as the trial which gives rise to it.’  
The Court pointed out that the Supreme Court of Appeal had found that 
broadcasting would not be permitted unless the Court was satisfied that it 
would not inhibit justice in that Court. The test incorporated the recogni-
tion of the primary obligation to ensure fair proceedings without denying the 
importance of the right to freedom of expression and the principle of open 
justice. The Constitutional Court held that it was satisfied that the decision 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal established an appropriate relationship of 
proportionality between the competing rights. 
The Court concluded that it cannot be said that the Supreme Court of Ap-
peal did not reach its verdict judicially and dismissed the appeal. 
6  DISCUSSION
6.1 General
The finding by the Constitutional Court that a court of appeal had the primary 
constitutional responsibility to ensure that proceedings before it are fair may 
convince some that a court of appeal is constitutionally obligated to treat the 
convicted individual or entity on appeal, and the prosecution fairly. However, 
in light of the fact that the Court proceeded to hold that this right was taken 
up in section 35(3) of the Constitution I have assumed the Court to have 
meant that a court of appeal was obligated to treat a convicted individual or 
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entity on appeal fairly. Section 35 provides arrested, detained and accused 
persons confronted by the criminal justice system with Constitutional rights 
and not the prosecution.  
I do not think that many will disagree with a finding that the Supreme Court 
of Appeal was obligated to ensure that Mr Shaik and the respondent compa-
nies on appeal before it were treated fairly. However, even then the reasoning 
by the majority of the Constitutional Court in reaching this decision raises 
some concerns in view of earlier decisions by the Constitutional Court and 
the wording of the Constitution, 1996. I will now discuss these concerns. 
6.2   The assumption by the Constitutional Court that section 
16 of the Constitution included the right to televise and 
broadcast criminal court proceedings
My first concern is the assumption by the Constitutional Court that section 
16 which entrenches the right to freedom of expression of the press and the 
right of the public to be informed, included the right to televise and broadcast 
criminal court proceedings. The Constitutional Court has in a line of decisions 
when it specifically dealt with the interaction between the criminal procedure 
rights in the Bill of Rights and other rights in the Bill erected a conceptual wall 
between the criminal procedure rights and the other rights. 
In Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) the 
Court erected such a wall between sections 11 and 25 of the interim Con-
stitution. Chaskalson P for the majority held that the primary though not 
necessarily the only purpose of section 11(1) was to ensure the protection 
of the physical liberty and physical security of the individual. According to 
the majority it did not depend on the construction of section 11 in isolation 
whether ‘freedom’ had a wider meaning but on its construction in the context 
of chapter 3 (paragraph 170). They found chapter 3 to be an extensive charter 
of freedoms that guarantees and gives protection in very specific terms (para-
graph 171). The detailed formulation of the rights in chapter 3 could therefore 
not be ignored in construing section 11. However, the majority did accept that 
section 11(1) has a residual content and that it may, in appropriate cases, 
protect fundamental freedoms not enumerated elsewhere in chapter 3 (para-
graph 184).
In De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) the Court erected the same 
wall between the equivalent rights in sections 12 and 35, of the Constitution, 
1996. The court in reading the interaction between sections 12 and 35 in 
much the same way as the majority in Ferreira v Levin held that the right to 
freedom and security primarily protect an individual’s physical integrity. The 
Court similarly held that the right to freedom functions as a ‘residual right 
– and may protect freedoms of a fundamental nature - especially procedural 
guarantees – not expressly protected elsewhere in the Bill of Rights’ (page 794 
paragraph 16 and further). 
The inclusion of a right to information in section 23 the interim Constitu-
tion furthermore sparked the debate as to whether an accused should have 
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access to the information held by the state. At first, it was primarily the issue 
concerning the right to discover the contents of the police docket for purposes 
of trial that came before the courts. Before the decision by the Constitutional 
Court in Shabalala v Attorney-General of the Transvaal 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 
(CC) there had been considerable debate as to whether or not section 23 of 
the interim Constitution applied when access to the police docket is required 
to advance an accused’s defence. Some high courts decided that section 23 
was applicable. Other courts indicated that they were uncertain. In some 
cases there were positive arguments that section 23 did not apply. 
In Shabalala the Constitutional Court decided on the right to information 
at trial in the context of the fair trial provision in section 25 of the Interim 
Constitution and not on the basis of section 23 (paragraph 34). Yet, the court 
still indicated that section 25(3) should not be read in isolation, but together 
with section 23 and in the broad context of a legal culture of accountability 
and transparency manifested by both the preamble to the Constitution, and 
the detailed provisions of chapter 3 (paragraph 35). 
However, it is clear that the Constitutional Court in Shabalala, when it 
declared the blanket docket privilege unconstitutional, decided the matter 
in the context of ensuring a fair trial. The test was therefore formulated as to 
whether the contents of the docket were necessary to enable the defence to 
prepare properly. Would the defence therefore be able to effectively exercise 
the constitutional right to properly ‘adduce and challenge evidence’, without 
access to the docket?
When the duty of the state to disclose information for purpose of the bail 
hearing eventually came before the high court, and on appeal to the Consti-
tutional Court in S v Dlamini; S v Dladla; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat 1999 (7) 
BCLR 771 (CC) the question was also not decided on the basis of the right 
to information afforded by section 32 of the Constitution, 1996. It was not 
even argued by counsel that section 60(14) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977, which refused an applicant for bail access to the contents of the 
police docket, had to comply with section 32 or, if in violation of section 32, 
that the government had to justify the infringement under section 36(1) of the 
Constitution which is the general limitation clause.
However, the Constitutional Court seems to have changed its mind con-
cerning the interaction between sections 12 and 35 of the Constitution with-
out indicating it as such. Twice the court denied conceptual similarity in the 
analytical process when it built up a conceptual wall between sections 11 
and 25 of the Interim Constitution and sections 12 and 35 of the Constitu-
tion, 1996. When the same court was faced with certain issues concerning 
bail in S v Dlamini; S v Dladla; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat supra the unani-
mous court, some of whom were instrumental in erecting the wall, and all the 
parties concerned, seemed to accept that the ‘right to bail’ in section 35(1)(f) 
is part of, or is a specific instance of, the right enumerated in section 12 (see 
the approach in paragraphs 6, 36 and 99 of the judgment and page 86 of 
the heads of argument by the Director of Public Prosecutions). It therefore 
seems that the parties concerned, including the court, while not specifically 
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deliberating about the interaction between sections 12 and 35, chose to ig-
nore the prior decisions by the Constitutional Court. Meanwhile many high 
court decisions tested bail problems as a liberty issue in terms of section 12. 
(The applicability of section 12 is of course crucial for the criminal process 
because it guarantees due process, and, as will be indicated later, allows for 
the transplantation of persuasive doctrines and principles leaving little scope 
for foundational confusion. The approach by the Courts in these decisions 
is also important for the discussion hereunder whether a court of appeal is 
constitutionally obligated to ensure that proceedings before it are fair).
Following the argument of the Constitutional Court in Ferreira, De Lange 
and Shabalala it seems that there will be a similar barrier between section 
16 and section 35 of the Constitution. Because section 35(3)(c) expressly 
provides an accused person with the right to a public trial before an ordinary 
court, section 16 will not apply.
6.3   The Court’s application of section 34 of the Constitution 
to a criminal appeal 
My second concern is the Court’s application of section 34 of the Constitution 
to a criminal appeal. In S v Pennington 1997 (10) BCLR (CC) paragraph 46 
the unanimous Court remarked obiter that section 34 of the Constitution did 
not apply to criminal proceedings:
‘The words “any dispute” may be wide enough to include criminal proceedings, but it is 
not the way such proceedings are ordinarily referred to. That section 34 has no applica-
tion to criminal proceedings seems to me to follow not only from the language used but 
also from the fact that section 35 of the Constitution deals specifically with the manner in 
which criminal proceedings must be conducted.’
The concluding part of the argument here is much the same as in Ferreira, De 
Lange and Shabalala. Because section 35 provides for the manner in which 
criminal proceedings are to be conducted section 34 will not apply. 
6.4   The Court’s reliance on section 35(3) of the Constitution 
to ensure fairness on appeal 
My third concern is the fact that the Constitutional Court relied on section 
35(3) of the Constitution to hold that it was the constitutional responsibility 
of the court of appeal to ensure that the applicants in the appeal were treated 
fairly. 
Section 35(3) bestows on an accused person the right to a fair trial which 
includes specific enumerated rights. A person convicted of an offence is no 
longer an accused person and an appeal hearing is not a trial. However, the 
inclusion of subsection 35(3)(o) which provides for the right to ‘an appeal to, 
or review by, a higher court’ as one of the enumerated rights in section 35(3) 
might create the impression that one remains an accused until after the final 
appeal or review in a case. If this were true a person on appeal must be en-
titled to the other enumerated constitutional rights in section 35(3) available 
to an accused confronted by a criminal trial. A convicted person would then 
for example have the following rights on appeal: to be informed of the charge 
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with sufficient detail to answer it, to be informed promptly that he may be 
presented by a legal practitioner of his choice, to be presumed innocent, to 
remain silent and not to testify during the proceedings, to adduce and chal-
lenge evidence. I submit that these rights were clearly meant only to apply to 
a person that has not been convicted and to a criminal trial.  
6.5   The Court’s finding that the Supreme Court of Appeal 
was obligated to ensure that appeal proceedings are 
fair because of its powers in terms of section 173 of the 
Constitution
My fourth concern is the finding by the Constitutional Court that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal had to ensure that the appeal proceedings before it were fair 
because of its powers in terms of section 173 of the Constitution, 1996. The 
Court even found that the exercise of this power will inevitably affect rights 
in the Bill of Rights including the right to a fair trial and cautioned that in the 
exercise of this power these rights must not be unjustifiably interfered with. 
I submit that the Supreme Court of Appeal cannot use this power to inter-
fere with a procedural right that has been provided for in the Constitution. In 
this instance the Constitutional Court cannot hold that a convicted person 
has a constitutional right to be treated fairly on appeal if the Constitution 
when dealing with the matter in section 35 provides only a person accused 
of an offence such a right at trial. The power in section 173 must be used in 
a manner consistent with the Constitution (see also Pennington and Another 
supra paragraph 23). The position held by the Constitutional Court brings 
about that the High Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitu-
tional Court could deviate from the Constitution on procedural issues if the 
court thought it appropriate.  
 The power must furthermore be used sparingly (see Parbhoo and Others 
v Getz NO and Another 1997 (10) BCLR 1337 (CC) paragraphs 4 and 5 and 
Pennington supra paragraph 22). In Parbhoo the Court used its powers in 
terms of section 173 to resolve an extraordinary situation pending the enact-
ment of legislation and the promulgation of rules of procedure. The Court 
made the point that the power related to the process of court arises when 
there is a legislative lacuna in the process (see also the separate dissenting 
minority judgment by Moseneke DCJ in the case under discussion with which 
Mokgoro J concurred in separate dissenting minority judgment). 
6.6  Concluding remarks
However, I agree that there must be and is a constitutional duty on the Su-
preme Court of Appeal to ensure that a convicted person is treated fairly on 
appeal. Section 12 of the Constitution bestows this duty. I submit that the 
approach by all the parties concerned in S v Dlamini; S v Dladla; S v Joubert; 
S v Schietekat supra in tearing down the wall between sections 12 and 35 
is correct. The criminal justice process constitutes an interference with the 
liberty of the subject by the state starting with the framing of laws which 
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prohibit conduct. This is followed by the arrest and detention of suspects, the 
process of determining guilt, the passing and enforcing of sentence, up to the 
restoration of the subject’s liberty, either upon acquittal or the setting aside 
of a conviction, or after service of sentence, or on parole. It does, therefore, 
seem that the rights in section 35 of the Constitution, 1996 must be regarded 
as part of, or specific instances of, the right enumerated in section 12 of the 
Constitution.
It is a pity that the substantial jurisprudence under Canadian law did not 
point the way. The relationship between section 7 and sections 10 and 11 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms clearly spelt out and is appar-
ent for all who would wish to study it.
The Canadian courts have opted for (due process) seepage of the provision 
in the Canadian Charter relating to deprivations of liberty ‘in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice’ in section 7 above, to the specifically 
enumerated criminal procedure rights found in sections 8 to 14 of the Charter. 
In Reference re section 9(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act [1985] 2 SCR 486 at 502ff 
(Can) Lamer J held that the enumerated criminal justice rights in sections 8 
to 14 of the Charter were merely illustrative of the generic due process right 
contained in section 7. It also seems that section 7 is not limited in its ambit 
to procedural challenges, but the Supreme Court appears to have imputed 
a substantive dimension to the term ‘fundamental justice’. Section 7 there-
fore not only protects those values already guaranteed in the criminal justice 
rights provided for in sections 8 to 14 of the Charter. If none of the provisions 
in sections 8 to 14 is understood to apply to a particular factual situation, sec-
tion 7 will also be used to determine whether the law in question corresponds 
with the principles of fundamental justice.
Under Canadian law section 7 of the Charter therefore operates as a ge-
neric and residual ‘due process’ right and assumes the character and status 
thereof. This due process right operates independently and informs the inter-
pretation of all the rights dealt with in sections 8 to 14 of the Charter. If none 
of the provisions in section 8 to 14 is understood to apply to particular facts, 
section 7 will be used to determine whether the law in question corresponds 
with the principles of fundamental justice.
The utilisation of section 7 as a generic and residual due process right 
ensures structural and conceptual similarity in the analytical process that 
would allow for transplantation of persuasive doctrines and principles with 
relatively little scope for foundational confusion. The safeguard built into this 
conceptual structure could then be easily assimilated into an analysis of con-
stitutional criminal procedure rights.
This confusion concerning the basic structure of the fundamental protec-
tion of the individual’s right to freedom and security and the interaction there-
of with the criminal procedure rights in the Constitution under South African 
law must be corrected. More specifically, the operation of section 12 of the 
Constitution as a general and residual due process right must be substanti-
ated. Without this correction we will forever be plagued by dissimilarity in 
the way persons that come into contact with the criminal justice system are 
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to be treated. Because the Constitutional Court has erected a conceptual wall 
between sections 12 and 35 when it specifically dealt with the interaction 
between these rights, we must at present accept that a person confronted by 
the criminal justice system does, for example during pre-trial procedures and 
during the appeal hearing, not have to be treated fairly in terms of the Consti-
tution. However, the Constitution directs that an accused person be treated 
fairly during the trial. 
Perhaps the most compelling reason for the existence and acceptance of a 
general ‘principle of fundamental justice’ is the fact that provision cannot be 
specifically made for fairness at each occurrence that might present itself in 
the criminal justice process. This is presumably exactly the reason why an 
accused is guaranteed a fair trial apart from the specific enumerated rights in 
section 35(3) of the Constitution. 
Taking into account the close link between the presumption of innocence, 
the right to freedom and security in section 12 and the criminal procedure 
rights in section 35, it is difficult to accept otherwise than that section 12 must 
have a residual due process function in the Canadian fashion. As far as the 
protection of the liberty of someone confronted by the criminal justice system 
goes section 34, therefore, seems redundant. Because section 12 has its own 
due process function, the application of section 34 to issues of liberty along-
side section 12 might even cause dissimilarity in approach by the criminal 
justice system towards someone who comes into contact with the system.
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